This paper considers an investor who, at a cost, can acquire a signal about an entrepreneurial project's payoff. The problem for this investor is that uninformed investors can compete to provide funding and the informed investor's contract offer conveys information to the entrepreneur about the project's likely payoffs, affecting the attractiveness of the entrepreneur's uninformed funding alternatives. I determine how the investor's choices of signal quality and contracting terms are affected by project primitives. I prove that equilibrium expected payoffs in this signaling game are unique and that equilibrium strategies solve simple optimal contracting problems, showing that informed investors can use equity, and that uninformed investors compete with simple debt. Finally, I show that introducing the possibility of commitment by the informed investor alters the structure of the game, but not equilibrium payoffs.
Introduction
In the standard paradigms of the theory of contracting, monitoring by a principal serves two roles. Ex-ante screening mitigates adverse selection: ex ante, the agent may have better information than the principal, and the principal's screening reduces any informational asymmetry. Ex-post monitoring deters moral hazard by the agent, in particular shirking or under-reporting of payoffs. Such monitoring mitigates moral hazard by reducing informational asymmetries.
While these are important aspects of contracting, this literature has largely overlooked how a principal's investigation can create information asymmetries that were not present previously. In particular, the principal may become better informed than the agent about some aspects of the project. This paper considers an investor who, upon a costly investigation, can become a better judge of the economic viability of an entrepreneur's project than the entrepreneur himself. The entrepreneur recognizes that while he may have a potentially valuable invention, he may not be as good a judge of its market value: most entrepreneurs are associated with only a few projects, while experienced investors are exposed to a wide variety of projects. The investor's evaluation is important-most entrepreneurial projects go unfunded for good reason.
The entrepreneur understands that such an informed investor can serve two key roles. First, the investor investigates and filters projects. If the investor performs a sufficiently detailed investigation, then his willingness to fund the project conveys positive information to the entrepreneur about the project's economic viability. Second, the informed investor can provide the capital necessary to fund the project. However, the informed investor is not the only party that can fund the project: post-investigation, the entrepreneur can obtain funding from uninformed sources.
The presence of this outside competition generates a signaling problem: the informed investor's contract conveys information to the entrepreneur. For example, if the informed investor does not offer a contract, this conveys bad news to the entrepreneur. Indeed, if the screening is so accurate that the bad news signaled by a non-offer renders the entrepreneur unwilling to pursue the project, then outside investors can compete away any profits from projects that receive good signals. But, this means that the informed investor cannot cover his screening costs, and will therefore not screen the project. I show that, as a result, uninformed outside competition for funding causes the informed investor to distort the quality of his information acquisition.
This paper develops the consequences of this outside funding competition for the equilibrium screening and financial contracting choices of an in-formed investor. In the three-stage game, the investor first chooses whether to initiate a costly investigation of the entrepreneur's project. If he investigates, the investor first selects his signal quality, then privately learns the signal realization, and finally decides whether to offer a contract. A contract specifies the share κ(x) of project payoffs x that the investor receives. Simultaneously, an uninformed investor can offer a competing contract. Finally, the entrepreneur decides whether to accept a contract or to pursue a reservation alternative.
I prove that the informed investor's equilibrium expected payoff in any subgame is unique; and, indeed, the equilibrium payoffs of the entire game to all parties are unique. In fact, on the equilibrium path, the contract and signal quality chosen by the informed investor solve a programming problem: maximize expected investor payoffs subject to inducing a lemons problem for uninformed investors. In equilibrium, the informed investor offers a contract with terms such that (1) following a good signal the entrepreneur is indifferent between acceptance and rejection if he believed that the informed investor's signal was bad with probability one; and (2) any investor who matches these terms and provides funds independently of the signal realizations cannot expect a strictly positive payoff. Together these two conditions ensure that uninformed investors lose money if they undercut the equilibrium contract.
The surprising uniqueness of equilibrium is a consequence of inducing a lemons problem-given the most pessimistic beliefs possible about the signal, the entrepreneur would accept any contract that marginally undercuts the equilibrium contract. Hence, strange pessimistic beliefs cannot support multiple equilibria.
The equilibrium also provides insight into how the informed and uninformed investors should design their contracts to affect the lemons problem: the informed investor wants to increase the severity of the lemons problem, while an uninformed investor wants to mitigate it. Interestingly, only the structure of the uninformed investor's contract matters, as the informed investor's contract design does not affect the lemons problem. Thus, in practice, the contract design by the informed investor should be determined solely by the classical considerations of agency theory. In contrast, the uninformed investor's contract design minimizes its attractiveness to the entrepreneur when the informed investor's contract signals that the project payoff is not high. It follows that provided that the payments to each party must be non-decreasing in the project payoff and higher project payoffs are associated with higher likelihoods of the good signal, then the uninformed investor's unique optimal contract is simple debt. Innes [1990] establishes a related result in a moral hazard setting and Nachmann and Noe [1994] do so in an adverse selection setting.
Finally, I investigate how the possibility of commitment alters equilibrium outcomes. Not surprisingly, if the informed investor can commit ex ante to the signal quality and contracting terms and the entrepreneur can commit to accepting the contract when offered, then the first best outcome is obtained. The informed investor extracts all informational rents, investigation quality is not distorted downwards, and investigation occurs if and only if it is socially desirable. What is more surprising is that if only the investor and not the entrepreneur can commit, then expected equilibrium payoffs are the same as in the game without commitment. The structure of the game is very differentthere are many fewer subgames-but the investor must still generate a lemons problem, with the result that his ex-ante contracting terms solve the same programing problem.
The paper is organized as follows. I next review the literature. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 focuses on the special case where the project has only two possible realizations: success or complete failure. Then, contract design is trivial, as only the contract payoff following success matters. I explicitly characterize the properties of projects that are investigated, and solve for how contracting terms, signal quality and investor profit vary with project primitives. Section 4 analyzes equilibria given a general state space for project payoffs. Section 5 shows how different levels of commitment by the different parties affect equilibrium outcomes. Section 6 discusses possible generalizations. All proofs are in the Appendix. Related Literature. Our paper contributes to the literatures on: (a) competition between investors, (b) information acquisition and screening by principals, and (c) contract design and the optimality of simple debt contracts. Broecker [1990] exogenously endows investors (banks) with noisy signals about an entrepreneur's project, and details conditions under which the banks, which compete on interest rates, earn strictly positive profits.
1 Villeneuve [2005] studies competition between perfectly-informed insurers who privately know a consumer's risk of loss, and offer contracts for full insurance, internalizing the information transmission via price about risk to consumers, showing that while a standard separating equilibrium exists, so too can multiple pooling equilibria that conceal information.
2 In contrast, I endogenize how the presence of an uninformed investor who can compete to provide funding 1 Dell'Ariccia et al. [1999] and Marquez [2002] look at competition between banks when there is adverse selection because some banks are endowed with information about the creditworthiness of past customers, but some borrowers are new; and other banks cannot distinguish between these populations.
2 More generally, there is a vast related literature on contracting by an informed principal dating back to Maskin and Tirole [1990] and Maskin and Tirole [1992] .
affects the decision to become informed by a single investor, the quality of information acquired, and the forms of contracting and contracting terms of investors.
The distortion in information acquisition that I find has the flavor of the Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] noisy rational expectations result. In their paper, if the equilibrium price is fully revealing then no information is acquired when information acquisition is costly. However, if, along the lines of Hellwig [1980] , there is added stochastic noise so that the competitive equilibrium price is partially revealing, then information may be acquired. In essence, I determine the endogenous amount of noise that arises in equilibrium when the investor chooses the signal quality, and derive the characteristics of the economy for which endogenous noise supports costly information acquisition.
Using the language of principal-agent theory, I consider the information acquisition and contract design problem of a principal who seeks to design a contract that makes it worthwhile for him to acquire information. Cremer et al. [1998] consider the opposite problem of principal designing a contract that induces the agent to acquire information, building on the Baron and Myerson [1982] model.
Explanations for simple debt contracts include costly state verification, as in Townsend [1979] , Gale and Hellwig [1985] , or Williamson [1986] ; or costly enforcement, as in Krasa and Villamil [2000] . Lacker and Weinberg [1989] and Allen and Gale [1992] show that non-contingent contracts do better at discouraging distortions in the reporting of profits. The model predicts that informed investors can use equity type contracts, while uninformed investors use simple debt. This mirrors practice in the United States: venture capital and angel finance do not use debt, whereas banks, which typically employ only credit scoring as a screening device, use debt. Debt is optimal for uninformed investors because it minimizes adverse selection for them: uninformed investors want to design contracts in order to discourage bad types from accepting the contract. This optimal contract design problem for the uninformed investor is, in effect, exactly the problem analyzed by Nachmann and Noe [1994] who consider a firm that knows the quality of its investment opportunity and must fund the project by raising external capital from uninformed investors: debt is optimal as a firm with a high quality project maximizes shareholder value by minimizing the appeal of mimicking their contract by firms with worse projects. Innes [1990] solves the analogous contracting problem in a moral hazard setting. Other papers on security design by an asymmetrically-informed intermediary include DeMarzo and Duffie [1999] , DeMarzo [2005] , Fulghieri and Lukin [2001] , and Inderst and Mueller [2007] . See also Wang and Williamson [1998] who consider a different adverse selection problem caused by the presence of good and bad borrowers who know their types. They
The Model
The environment features three risk neutral agents, a potential entrepreneur with a project and two potential investors i = 1, 2. The entrepreneur's project requires one unit of external funding to be developed. If developed, the project's payout is given by a random variable X ≥ 0. The distribution of X is common knowledge. If the entrepreneur does not pursue the project, he can work for a reservation wage of w > 0, which is public information. In practice, w is large: w captures the opportunity costs of the entrepreneur and the potential key employees of a start-up, typically workers with significant outside alternatives; and w also includes the value of entrepreneurial capital (the market value of patents and product ideas) plus compensation for any utility cost of working for the firm plus any personal capital that the entrepreneur might have to put into the project.
Investor 1 can either remain uninformed, in which case he incurs no information acquisition costs, or he can acquire a signal of "quality q" about the project's payoff at cost c(q) > 0, where q ∈ [0, 1]. Here c(0) > 0 captures the fixed cost associated with any investigation, even one that provides no information. The signal quality is public information, but the signal realization is private information to investor 1. I assume only that c(q) is non-decreasing in q. There are two possible signal realizations: good g, and bad b.
4 A higher signal quality q ∈ [0, 1] implies a higher expected payoff when the signal is good, and a lower expected payoff when the signal is bad. That is, E[X|σ(q) = g] is strictly increasing in q, while E[X|σ(q) = b] is strictly decreasing in q. Quality choice q = 0 yields an uninformative signal, i.e., X and σ(0) are uncorrelated. Further, at q = 1, a bad signal is sufficiently informative that w > E[X|σ(1) = b].
5 Finally, I assume that the ex-ante probability of a good signal, p = P (σ(q) = g), does not vary with q.
Remark. The key model feature is that higher signal qualities imply that a good signal conveys better news about expected project payoffs, and a bad signal conveys worse news. In the two-state setting of Section 3, where a project predict a separating equilibrium in which good and bad borrowers separate and types receive funding: in equilibrium, good borrowers self-select and choose debt funding, while bad borrowers are screened, and the structure of their contract is indeterminate. 4 The unique equilibrium that we characterize also exists when there are more than two signals. In particular, there always exists an equilibrium in which there is pooling on the same funding terms following all sufficiently good signals, and pooling on non-funding on all sufficiently bad signals. See the conclusion for a further discussion.
5 This assumption is stronger than necessary for our results to hold. This stronger assumption eases exposition. either succeeds and paysx or fails completely, the modeling structure implies that with probability q, investor 1's signal correctly identifies the project quality, and with residual probability 1−q, the signal is an uninformative draw from his prior. Thus, as signal quality q goes from zero to one, the probability a signal is correct rises from p to 1. This is not the only plausible modeling structure with this feature. In a two-state setting, q could alternatively capture investor 1's filtering of lemons, where screening identifies fraction q of bad projects (and delivers a good signal for all other projects). This filtering of lemons would also have the feature that the probability of a correct signal rises from p to 1 as q goes from zero to one, even though the probability of a good signal falls from 1 to p. Alternatively, q could capture the probability that screening identifies a project as good. Then the probability a signal is correct would rise from 1 − p to 1 as q went from zero to one, and the probability of a good signal would rise. Qualitatively identical results hold for these alternative settings. A virtue of my assumption that the probability of a good signal does not vary with q is that it easily accommodates many realizations of X, and simplifies presentation.
Investors can offer funding contracts κ(·) to the entrepreneur, where the payment to the investor is κ(x)x, and the payoff to the entrepreneur is (1 − κ(x))x. That is, without loss of generality, I focus on contracts that specify the state-contingent share of the realization that each party receives.
I allow for the possibility that the space S of potential contracts may be restricted, e.g., by continuity, differentiability or monotonicity requirements. However, unless otherwise stated, I only impose the following restrictions on S:
Measurability: All κ ∈ S are measurable. Closedness: Let κ n ∈ S for all n ∈ N and let lim n→∞ κ n = κ a.e. Then κ ∈ S. Convexity: S is convex. Limited Liability: κ(x) ∈ [0, 1] for a.e. x ∈ R + and for all κ ∈ S. Fixed Share: S contains the functions k ≡ 0 and k ≡ 1.
With convexity, the fixed share restriction implies that S includes all fixed equity contracts, which I denote by k ∈ [0, 1].
The game proceeds as follows: where κ i ∈ S.
6 Investor 1 can make a contract offer independently of whether he investigates.
Stage 3 If a contract is offered, the entrepreneur decides whether to pursue the project, or take his outside option, w. If the entrepreneur pursues the project, he selects his preferred contract.
If funding by investor i is accepted, then investor i's payoff gross of any costs of investigation is κ(x)x−1, while the entrepreneur's payoff is (1−κ(x))x, where x is the project realization. If the entrepreneur rejects all contracts, the gross project payoff is zero. The informed investor's net payoff consists of his gross payoff minus any investigation costs.
No Outside Funding Competition
As a benchmark, consider first the signal quality and share choices by investor 1 if he faces no outside competition from other investors. Then, absent outside competition to provide funding, investor 1 would choose q and k to solve
subject to
The constraint of Problem 1 binds, with the entrepreneur receiving his outside alternative in expectation whenever there is a good signal, so that he is funded-were this not so, the objective could be increased by raising k. Substituting the constraint into investor 1's objective reveals that, absent competition, the optimal signal choice maximizes total surplus:
I now contrast this outcome with those that obtain when investor 1 faces outside competition to provide funding.
Outside Competition: Success or Failure
To begin, suppose that the only possible realizations of X are 0 andx, i.e., the project either succeeds and pays offx, or it fails completely. As a result, only the contract payoff following success matters, so the universe of contracts reduces to the set of non-state-contingent shares k i that investor i receives when the project succeeds.
Becoming Well Informed Can be Unprofitable
To highlight starkly how outside competition to provide funding leads to low, socially inefficient, levels of information acquisition and to provide intuition for subsequent results, suppose that investor 1 can only acquire a signal with qualityq that is sufficiently informative that a bad signal realization, σ(q) = b, indicates that project payoffs are not expected to cover the entrepreneur's costs, i.e., E[X|σ(q) = b] < w.
Theorem 1 Suppose there is only one signal qualityq and E[X|σ(q) = b] < w. Then in any Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, information is not acquired and investors' expected profits are zero.
If investor 1 becomes informed, but does not offer a contract, the entrepreneur can infer that the signal was bad. But then the entrepreneur prefers his reservation wage alternative to a contract from investor 2. This follows from the condition that
Consequently, investor 2 knows that his contract offer will only be accepted if the signal is good. As a result, when the signal is good, Bertrand competition reduces profits gross of information acquisition costs down to zero. It follows that information acquisition is unprofitable. The proof extends this reasoning to preclude the possibility of profitable mixed strategies.
Theorem 1 has the flavor of the Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] noisy rational expectations result. There, if the equilibrium price is fully revealing then no information is acquired if information acquisition is costly. However, if, along the lines of Hellwig [1980] , there is added stochastic noise so the competitive equilibrium price is partially revealing, then information may be acquired. In what follows I determine the endogenous amount of noise that arises in equilibrium when the informed investor chooses the signal quality, and determine the characteristics of the economy for which endogenous noise supports costly information acquisition in equilibrium.
Equilibria with Information Acquisition
I now return to the original model in which investor 1 can acquire any signal quality q ∈ [0, 1]. Investor 1's dilemma is that he wants a more accurate signal in order to reduce the probability of funding a bad project; but, if he lowers this probability by too much, uninformed investor 2 can profitably undercut any profitable offer by him.
As a preliminary step, Lemma 1 establishes that following any signal quality choice q, an equilibrium exists to the subgame, and it provides informed investor 1 a unique expected equilibrium subgame payoff. It also details when informed investor 1 can earn positive expected gross profits that could cover information acquisition costs.
Lemma 1 Following any signal quality choice q, a subgame perfect equilibrium
The following is an equilibrium of the subgame: Investor 1 offers k 1 = k(q) if and only if σ(q) = g; and investor 2 offers k 2 = k(q). The entrepreneur accepts investor 1's contract.
Investor 1's expected gross profit is zero in all other subgames.
The proof works through all subgames, proving that expected payoffs are unique, and providing supporting equilibrium strategies. Obviously, if E[X|σ(q) = g] − 1 ≤ w, then investor 1 cannot earn gross positive profits, even when he receives a good signal. Further, if E[X|σ(q) = g] − 1 > w, but E[X|σ(q) = b] < w, then the logic of Theorem 1 ensures that investor 1 cannot earn positive gross profits. That is, if investor 1 does not offer a contract, the entrepreneur infers that the signal was bad, and E[X|σ(q) = b] < w ensures that the entrepreneur prefers his reservation wage to pursuing the project. As a result, investor 2 can compete away all profits following good signals without repercussion.
Thus, E[X|σ(q) = g] − 1 > w and E[X|σ(q) = b] ≥ w are necessary for investor 1 to be able to earn positive expected gross profits, and hence possibly cover his information acquisition costs. The key equilibrium determinant is the share value k(q) at which the entrepreneur is indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer if he knows that σ(q) = b. For investor 1 to obtain strictly positive gross profits, the share k 1 cannot exceed k(q). If it did, investor 2 could undercut k 1 without fear of being accepted when investor 1 does not make an offer, i.e., when σ(q) = b. But then Bertrand competition would drive gross profits to zero. Thus, to obtain positive gross profits that would allow investor 1 to cover his information acquisition costs, k 1 cannot exceed k(q).
There are three possibilities: If E[k(q)X] ≤ 1, then investor 2 cannot undercut k(q), and cover his investment costs, even when he funds the project following both good and bad signals. As a result, when E[k(q)X|σ(q) = g] > 1, investor 1 can offer k 1 = k(q) when he receives a good signal, induce a lemons problem for investor 2 so that he is not undercut, and thereby earn positive expected gross profits. If, instead, E[k(q)X] > 1, then were investor 1 always to offer contract k(q), investor 2 could undercut and make money funding the project following both good and bad signals. It follows that equilibrium in this subgame must be in mixed strategies, where the lower support of investor 1's mixed strategy solves E[kX] = 1, as investor 2 can ensure profits if the lower support exceeds k, but would never undercut with a contract k 2 < k; investor 1's indifference between his contracts, then implies that his profits are E[kX|σ(q) = g] − 1 when σ(q) = g and 0, otherwise. Finally, if
, then the demands of inducing a lemons problem for investor 2 by making outside funding following a bad signal attractive to an entrepreneur with opportunity cost w are so high that investor 1 cannot also cover his investment costs.
The surprising and unusual result in Lemma 1 is that in any subgame with information acquisition, the informed investor's equilibrium payoff is unique, without appeal to any refinement save subgame perfection. The game with information acquisition is a signaling game, one where informed investor 1's offer of k 1 can reveal information about his type -his signal about whether the project is good. Typically, dynamic games of incomplete information support many different equilibrium payoffs absent strong equilibrium refinements. For example, in a classical education signaling game, beliefs by firms that a student's type is bad unless he acquires excessive levels of education, support a continuum of equilibria with different payoffs. This logic does not apply here. In particular, suppose there were an equilibrium in which investor 1 offered a contract k 1 < k(q) that the entrepreneur accepts, and investor 2 does not make a competing offer. In standard signaling games, such strategies can be supported as equilibrium by beliefs that assign the bad type to any offer k 1 > k 1 together with beliefs that the type is good when k 1 ≤ k 1 . But here even if the entrepreneur believes with probability one that investor 1 observed a bad signal following k 1 with k 1 < k 1 < k(q), the entrepreneur is still strictly better off accepting the contract, as
Therefore, optimization by investor 1 leads him to offer share k(q).
With this result in hand, I show how the competition from uninformed investor 2 causes investor 1 to reduces the signal quality that he choses in equilibrium. In particular, Theorem 2 proves that any equilibrium with information acquisition solves the following optimization problem:
Theorem 2 1. If investor 1 acquires information, then investor 1's equilibrium share k 1 and signal quality q solve Problem 2 and
, investor 1's payoff is non-negative. 2. Conversely, let k * 1 and q * solve Problem 2 and suppose
Then there exists an equilibrium in which investor 1 acquires information, and selects share k * 1 and signal quality q * .
The objective in Problem 2 is investor 1's ex-ante expected profit given that finance is extended if and only if the project viability signal is good, i.e. if and only if σ(q) = g. Investor 1 chooses the project signal quality q and equity share k 1 to maximize these profits.
To understand why constraints 1 and 2 must hold in equilibrium, first note that if information acquisition is too accurate, i.e., if q is too close to one, then constraint 1 is violated as E[(1 − k 1 )X|σ(1) = b] < w. The left-hand side of constraint 1 is the entrepreneur's expected payoff when investor 1 receives a bad signal. The right-hand side is the entrepreneur's payoff when he does not pursue the project. If constraint 1 is violated, then uninformed investor 2 can compete away all rents, as the entrepreneur would not pursue finance when investor 1 does not make an offer. Constraint 2 ensures that an uninformed investor who undercuts investor 1's terms, and hence in view of constraint 1 funds the project in all states of the world, cannot profit. If c(q) = c, so that higher quality signals are not more costly, then investor 1 will raise the signal quality until constraint 1 holds as an equality. More generally, if higher quality signals are more costly and constraint 2 binds (pinning down k), investor 1 may choose a sufficiently low quality signal that constraint 1 does not bind.
To understand the impact of outside funding competition on information acquisition, suppose that constraint 1 of Problem 2 binds, while constraint 2 is slack. Define
, which is strictly increasing in q and greater than 1 for q > 0 (recall that E[X|σ(q) = g] is strictly increasing in q and E[X|σ(q) = b] is strictly decreasing). Substituting constraint 1 into the objective of Problem 2 reveals how investor 1 chooses signal quality when he facts outside competition to provide funding from investor 2:
Contrasting investor 1's objective (4) when he faces outside competition to his objective (2) when he does not, reveals that it differs solely by the presence of ζ(q) ≥ 1: competition causes investor 1 to choose a weakly lower value for q. This follows directly because ζ(q) rises with q. The inequality is strict as long as the cost function is differentiable and the optimum is characterized by first-order conditions, or if the optimum absent competition is close enough to q = 1. In essence, raising q in the presence of competition not only affects costs via c(q), but it also decreases the payoff to the entrepreneur following a bad signal, inducing investor 2 to compete more aggressively. An analogous result holds when constraint 2 binds or both constraints bind.
Explicit Characterizations and Comparative Statics
As the probability of a good signal does not vary with its quality, the probability p that the project pays offx equals the probability p of a good signal. In this two-signal setting, there is one free parameter describing signal quality, so it is without loss of generality to assume that a signal of quality q yields the true state with probability q, but is a random draw from the prior with probability 1 − q.
To highlight investor 1's strategic incentives to limit information acquisition, suppose that c (q) = 0, i.e., there is only a fixed cost of information acquisition. As a result, the only reason not to acquire better information is if superior information adversely affects the equilibrium financial contracting terms. One can solve Problem 2 explicitly for the equilibrium values of q and k 1 as a function of p, w andx. Figure 1 illustrates how investor 1's equilibrium expected payoff varies with the probability p that the project is viable.
One can show that the key features illustrated in Figure 1 hold for arbitrary w andx. In particular, as Figure 1 illustrates, if p is too small or too large, then informed finance is infeasible. This is because when p is small, investor 1 cannot even find a k 1 that induces a lemons problem for the uninformed investor; and when p is large, uninformed investor 2 would face little The graph shows that informed investor's ex-ante expected profit for the following parameter values:x = 4, w = 0.1, c(q) = 0.3, for all q ∈ [0, 1]. p is the probability that X =x. The solid line is the actual payoff. The dotted portion of the convex curve shows investor 1's profit were one to ignore the fact that constraint 2 binds, so that E[k 1 X] > 1. The dotted part of the concave curve assumes that constraint 2 binds, so that E[k 1 X] = 1, even when p is small enough that investor 1 does better by choosing a smaller share and acquiring better information.
risk from competing if investor 1 tried to retain enough surplus to cover c(q).
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Thus, when p is too low, no funding is provided in the unique equilibrium; when p is intermediate, then in the unique equilibrium, informed investor 1 acquires information and funds the project following a good signal, and when p is too high, in equilibrium only uninformed finance is offered, with both investors offering contracts that break even in expectation (and either investor can fund the project).
When only constraint 1 binds, one can solve it for k, substitute into the objective, and then differentiate with respect to q to solve for how the optimal signal quality,
and share
vary with the primitives. In particular, the noise w px (1−p) introduced to the signal increases 7 For such safe projects both constraints of Problem 2 bind. Combining the constraints reveals that E[X] − 1 > w (i.e., the project's surplus covers w). As a result the project receives investment in equilibrium (with each investor offering a contract that breaks even in expectation, offering contracts with
with the entrepreneur's outside option w, reflecting that it is harder to make it attractive for the entrepreneur to pursue a project with a bad signal, and it decreases in the payoff of a successful project (which makes pursing the project more attractive), and p(1 − p) (which is proportional to the variance in project payoff). Observe that as the entrepreneur's opportunity cost w goes to zero, so does the distortion in information acquisition, as the entrepreneur is willing to pursue a project even if a high quality bad signal suggests that the project is very unlikely to pay off.
As Figure 1 illustrates, for small values of p where only constraint 1 binds, profits are a convex, increasing function of p. In this region, E[k 1 X] < 1 so that investor 2 would lose money by offering k 2 = k 1 . Therefore, it is sufficient for investor 1 to generate a lemons problem-k 1 and q are not limited in any other way. The intuition for the convexity is as follows. When the project is unlikely to pay off, it is hard to make investor 2's contract attractive to the entrepreneur when σ(q) = b-investor 1 must both take a small share of the firm and choose a low signal quality. Fixing k 1 and q, investor 1's ex-ante payoff would increase linearly in p, as the objective (3) would be the product of p and a constant. But, raising p also makes it is easier to induce a lemons problem. As a result, investor 1 can increase both q and k 1 without inviting uninformed competition. This increase of k 1 and q raises ex-ante payoffs from linear in p to convex.
Investor 1's ex-ante payoff function becomes concave in p when constraint 2 binds so that E[kX] = 1. When both constraints bind, one can solve them for q 1 = 1 − , increases in w, reflecting that a higher w makes it harder to make it attractive for the entrepreneur to pursue a project with a bad signal; and it decreases in the expected project payoff, px, which makes it easier to induce the entrepreneur to pursue a project following a bad signal (thereby creating a lemons problem for investor 2). Once constraint 2 binds (at the tangency point of the convex and concave curves), when p is raised further, investor 1 must lower k to prevent investor 2 from undercutting his contract, i.e., to retain E[k 1 X] = 1. Therefore, the linear increase in ex-ante payoff due to an increase in p is dampened by the reduction of k 1 , causing payoffs to be concave in p. Finally, because the slope of ex-ante payoffs is positive at the tangency point, it follows that the p that maximizes investor 1's ex-ante payoff is on the concave portion.
This analysis suggests that investor 1 prefers riskier projects. Still, one cannot yet draw this conclusion as p affects both a project's mean return and its risk. I now show that the value of information acquisition is greater if, ceteris paribus, the project's variance is higher. It follows that a risk-neutral informed investor prefers riskier projects, and that projects with sufficiently large surplus, E[X] − 1 > w, that are too safe can only receive uninformed investment. Thus, one can reconcile empirical findings in Fiet and Fraser [1994] and Hellmann [1997] , who document that banks invest in safer projects. I now formally state this result.
Theorem 3 For a given expected project payoff px, increasing the project variance raises the informed investor's ex-ante expected profit. Informed finance is infeasible if the project's variance is too low.
Outside Competition: General State Space for Project Payoffs
I now consider a general setting that allows for many project realizations. With many possible project realizations, if one simply restrict attention to equity contracts the analysis in the previous section (e.g., Lemma 1) extends immediately. However, one wants to allow for a broader class of contracts than just equity to address how investors design contracts in response to the screening problem, and how this feeds back to affect equilibrium outcomes. Because informed investor 1 only funds the project following a good signal, the form of his contract does not affect the lemons problem that investor 2 faces. Consequently, contracts that deliver the same level of expected project payoffs are equivalent from investor 1's perspective: a contract κ is equivalent to an equity contract with share ψ g (κ) =
. In contrast, uninformed investor 2 wants to design his contract to mitigate the lemons problem that he faces when investor 1 receives a bad signal. Problem 3 below is the generalization of Problem 2 to multi-state environments.
Problem 3 max
where κ U (·) solves Problem 4:
The objective in Problem 3 reveals that investor 1 can continue to use a pure equity contract. However, Problem 4 reflects that uninformed investor 2 wants to design his contract to minimize the attractiveness of his contract to the entrepreneur when σ(q) = b. Investor 2 is constrained by the fact that his contract must be competitive with investor 1's contract when it is optimal to provide funding-it must be as attractive to the entrepreneur as informed investor 1's contract when investor 1 receives a good signal σ(q) = g. Hence, his contract solves Problem 4. Constraints 1 and 2 of Problem 3 are the analogues to the constraints of Problem 2. The first constraint says that if investor 2 offers a contract that is more attractive to the entrepreneur than κ U then this contract is accepted by the entrepreneur even when σ(q) = b (where k and κ U are linked via the constraint in Problem 4). The second constraint implies that investor 2 would lose money from doing so.
Before I state the equilibrium characterization result, I provide a lemma proving that solutions exist to the uninformed investor's optimization problem, Problem 4, and that the objective is continuous and strictly decreasing in k. I impose the following assumptions to derive the lemma: The random variable X either has a finite support or is distributed continuously, in which case I assume that the distribution of X conditional on signal σ(q) = s, s = b, g has a density function with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Lemma 2 Indexing investor 2's optimal contract by the share k offered by investor 1, Problem 4 has a solution κ
Lemma 2 ensures that if E[X|σ(q) = b] > w, then there exists a κ that solves Problem 4 such that E[(1 − κ(X))X)|σ(q) = b] = w. Once more, the logic of Theorem 1 means that investor 1 must ensure that if investor 2 undercuts with an optimally-designed contract that appeals to the entrepreneur following a good signal, then it must also appeal to the entrepreneur following a bad signal, else investor 2 can compete away all profits following a good signal. Define k(q) to be the fixed share that gives the entrepreneur the same payoff as κ. This k(q) plays the same role as the contract with share k that fulfills E[(1 − k)X)|σ(q) = b] = w in the analysis of Problem 2. In particular, suppose investor 1 offers a contract with fixed share k(q) (or any other contract that gives the entrepreneur the same payoff). Then investor 2 faces a lemons problem if he undercuts: if investor 2 offers any contractκ with a higher payoff to the entrepreneur than k(q) when σ(q) = b, then this contract is always accepted in the bad state since E[(1 −κ(X))X)|σ(q) = b] > w.
I can now state the equilibrium characterization result for general state spaces. I pose the theorem in the context of a project that needs to be investigated to receive funding. The project could have a positive ex-ante NPV, E[X] − 1 > 0, but the surplus is not sufficiently large to cover the entrepreneur's alternative opportunity, w. In practice, w may be high if the potential entrepreneur has significant human capital and hence a high reservation alternative, e.g., a good salary at an existing job. A project with E[X] − 1 > w could, in principle, be funded without investigation. In practice, with venture capital finance, only 10-15% of projects that receive extensive scrutiny by a VC are funded by the VC, indicating that the ex-ante surplus from these projects is unlikely to cover w.
Theorem 4 Suppose that the project's ex-ante expected payoff is less than the reservation wage of the entrepreneur, i.e., E[X] − 1 < w. Then 1. If investor 1 acquires information and q * and k * (·) are the equilibrium signal quality and contract choice, then k =
and q = q * solve Problem 3, and p(E[kX|σ(q 
Then there exists an equilibrium in which investor 1 selects a non-state contingent share k * , signal quality q * , and funds the project if and only if σ(q * ) = g; while investor 2 always offers κ U (·).
The proof of Theorem 4 first shows that because E[X] − 1 < w, if informed investor 1 offers a contract following a bad signal, he must hide this from the entrepreneur by offering the same contract with sufficient probability after a good signal, else the entrepreneur would have to lose money (as investor 1 would not offer an unprofitable contract). Further, investor 1 cannot always offer a contract when σ(q) = b, else the entrepreneur's expected payoff cannot be raised to w. But, such randomization by the informed investor implies that his expected profits from a contract that is accepted when σ(q) = b must be zero. This observation simplifies the analysis of the game because it means that one can focus on investor 1's expected profits when σ(q) = g.
The proof of Theorem 4 follows that of Theorem 2. The main difference is that investor 2 does not offer a contract with a fixed share, but rather a contract κ(x) that solves Problem 4. Investor 2 does this to minimize his exposure to the lemons problem. In sharp contrast, the particulars of informed investor 1's contract do not matter. Indeed, suppose there are two contracts, κ A and κ B that are not equal to κ U but are payoff equivalent in the good state. Then, if κ A is accepted in any equilibrium subgame, so is κ B . Once more, the reason is that even if the entrepreneur has the most pessimistic belief that the signal is bad, it pays him more than w and hence he strictly prefers to accept it. That is, the particular design of investor 1's contract is not affected by the information acquisition problem-the only way to affect the lemons problem is via the signal quality q and the expected contract payoff following a good signal. This means that in practice, other considerations, such as classical agency issues, should guide investor 1's contract design.
Investor 2's Contract Design
Uninformed investor 2's optimization problem 4 is analogous to a moral hazard problem with two effort levels e ∈ {b, g} for a principal who wants to implement effort g. Innes [1990] analyzes precisely this contracting problem. In particular, let f j (x) be the distribution over x following σ(q) = j, j = b, g, and suppose that f g (x)/f b (x) is monotone in x, i.e., the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds. Then absent any additional constraint on the set of feasible contracts S there existsx such that the optimal contract pays everything to the investor if x <x and everything to the entrepreneur if x ≥x.
However, in practice, the set of feasible contracts is likely smaller, due to incentive compatibility issues that arise. In particular, Bolton and Dewatripont [2005] p. 164 argue that if either the investor's payoff or the entrepreneur's payoff is not weakly increasing in x, then significant moral hazard concerns emerge. For example, the entrepreneur would strictly gain from borrowing money to boost revenue and mix them in undetected with actual cash flow. So, too, an investor would have an incentive to take actions (e.g., excessive monitoring) that lower output. With this monotonicity constraint Innes [1990] and Nachmann and Noe [1994] show that simple debt contracts solve Problem 4, i.e., there existsx such that κ(x)x = x for x <x and κ(x)x =x for all x ≥x. That is, investor 2 wants to give more to the entrepreneur following realizations that are associated with higher likelihoods of the good signal, which given the MLRP are the higher states, but with the monotonicity restriction on investor 2's own payoff, a flat payment is the best that he can do.
Ex-ante Contracting
Full Commitment. Given the distortions in information acquisition that emerge in all equilibria, the question arises as to whether the distortions can be reduced or eliminated by ex-ante contracting. To highlight the impact of commitment, I suppose that the marginal cost of more accurate signals is zero. Ex-ante contracting requires commitment by the entrepreneur and investor to the terms of the contract. For example, such commitment may be supported for the investor by reputation concerns.
The game with full commitment proceeds as follows:
1. Investor 1 can offer a contract specifying a signal quality q and share k 1 that applies if he offers funding. 2. The entrepreneur decides whether to accept the contract.
(a) If the entrepreneur accepts the contract, investor 1 investigates and offers signal-contingent funding. (b) If the entrepreneur rejects the contract, the game without commitment detailed in section 2 starts.
Theorem 5 The equilibrium of the game with full commitment has the following features:
1. There is no distortion in signal acquisition, i.e., q = 1, and no commitment to q is necessary. 2. The entrepreneur's equilibrium payoff is the same as without ex-ante contracting. Investor 1 extracts all of the additional surplus from the higher quality investigation.
Clearly, the entrepreneur will accept the ex-ante contract if and only if his expected payoff from accepting is at least as high as his payoff from the original game, which is the solution to Problem 3 as shown in Theorem 4. Given the assumption that projects are unfundable following a perfectly accurate bad signal, i.e., E[X|σ(1) = b] < w, it follows immediately that q = 1 violates the first constraint of Problem 3, and hence q < 1 in equilibrium. Thus, with full commitment investor 1 can increase total surplus, maximizing it by setting q = 1. Given the entrepreneur's strategy it follows immediately that investor 1 extracts all surplus. Also, since it is optimal to set q = 1, there is no need to write q into the contract. Partial Commitment. Commitment by the informed investor to a particular contract can be motivated by reputational concerns. It is harder, however, to justify commitment by the entrepreneur. In practice, an entrepreneur cannot be forced to take funding and start a project against his will. In particular, once q = 1 has been chosen and a contract offered, the entrepreneur may not accept that all surplus goes to investor 1 and could bargain for better terms. The entrepreneur's ability to do this hinges on his outside option, i.e., on what he can get from another investor. I therefore amend the game with full commitment to allow the entrepreneur to reject investor 1's initial offer ex-post and pursue finance from investor 2. The game is as follows:
1. Investor 1 can offer a contract specifying a signal quality q and a contract κ Theorem 6 In the game with partial commitment, the expected equilibrium payoffs to all agents are unique. Payoffs correspond to those in the game with no commitment of Section 2.
Equilibria to the game with partial commitment are quite different from the game without commitment. In particular, there is no mixing in subgames, and investor 2 need not make offers. This latter result follows because investor 1, when choosing his contract, anticipates the possibility of an offer from investor 2 if he does not design his contract appropriately.
On first contemplation, the different structures of the equilibria make it surprising that commitment by investor 1 cannot improve equilibrium outcomes. But reflection resolves this puzzle-both with partial commitment and without, investor 1 must create a lemons problem for investor 2; and Theorem 2 demonstrates that in the game without commitment, investor 1 chooses the signal quality and contracting terms that maximize his expected payoff subject to the constraint of inducing a lemons problem. It follows that commitment does not help investor 1.
Conclusion
In this paper, I characterize how potential competition from uninformed investors affects the quality of screening and the structure of optimal contracts. I derive how the presence of outside competition to provide funding distorts information acquisition, and prove that the optimal contract offered by uninformed investors is simple debt. Remarkably for a signaling framework, equilibrium payoffs are unique, so that one can derive how payoffs vary with the primitives of the economy.
The one important assumption of the model is that the quality of the informed investor's signal is observable. Equivalently, the informed investor can commit to a maximum signal quality (in practice, the term sheets that venture capitalists give entrepreneurs specify a time frame in which the venture capitalist will investigate and then make a decision about whether to fund; and this restricted time frame can serve to bound the quality of the investigation).
If the signal quality is unobserved, then the informed investor always has an incentive to gather more information (up to where marginal benefit equals marginal cost); but if at this signal quality level, a lemons problem for the uninformed investor is not introduced, then the informed investor cannot profit from his information, and information acquisition unwinds. Most transparently, consider the case when more accurate signals are not more costly, and signal quality is not observable. Then fixing beliefs of the entrepreneur as if quality chosen solves problem 2 (i.e., induces a lemons problem), investor 1 has an incentive to acquire perfectly informative signals. But then an equilibrium with information acquisition cannot obtain.
One simplification of an otherwise general model is that the informed investor only receives a binary signal. Suppose, instead, there are more than two possible signal realizations that the informed investor could receive, where higher signals indicate that higher project payoffs are more likely. With more than two signals, the "two-signal" equilibrium that I characterize continues to be a natural equilibrium, where the informed investor offers the same "best" contract for all sufficiently high signals, and no contract for all lower signals. With this pooling by the informed investor, the entrepreneur updates in the same way as in the two-signal model, so that it is optimal for the uninformed investor to use a simple debt contract and the "two-signal" equilibrium extends.
Pooling by the informed investor on his "best" contract when he makes an acceptable offer is robust in senses that can be made precise. However, the informed investor need not pool when he offers a contract that will be rejected-ex post, the informed investor is indifferent between the unacceptable contracts that he offers when he does not provide funding-and such offers can reveal information to the entrepreneur that could affect his willingness to pursue uninformed investment, giving rise to multiple equilibria. For example, following bad signals b A and b B for which informed investor 1 does not want to extend funding, he could simply not offer funding as in the "two-signal" equilibrium. However, he could instead offer contracts k
, that the entrepreneur would always find unattractive and reject (in essence, cheap talk), but which would convey the signal realizations to the entrepreneur, and hence affect his willingness to accept investor 2's contract, thereby affecting the extent to which investor 2 is subject to a lemons problem. I have not investigated the properties of these equilibria.
The other simplifying assumption made is that the entrepreneur's reservation utility, w, is public information at the time that contracts are offered. One could imagine that w is private information to the entrepreneur-investors only know the distribution over w. When the distribution over w is continuous, the pure strategy equilibrium that I characterize ceases to exist. Rather, the unique equilibrium structure mirrors the mixed strategy equilibrium in subgames (see the proofs of Lemma 1 or Theorem 4) where the informed investor acquires too little information.
8 In the equilibrium, the informed investor's mixed strategy gives the uninformed investor zero expected profits-the informed investor induces a lemons problem in expectation. The uninformed investor does not always compete, but when he does, he uses a simple debt contract to minimize the lemons problem. When the uninformed investor does offer the debt contract, he sometimes profitably undercuts the informed investor's contract when there is a good signal; but at the same time the uninformed investor faces a lemons problem and loses money when the informed investor receives a bad signal and the entrepreneur's realization of w is low.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. I first prove that in any subgame starting at stage 2, informed investor 1 cannot make strictly positive gross (of investigation costs) profits. Suppose information is acquired in equilibrium. Then
Thus, the entrepreneur will reject any (possibly profitable) contract that reveals σ(q) = b.
Next, suppose that investor 1 only offers a contract following a good signal, and let k h and both are played with strictly positive probability. This is an immediate contradiction, because either party could strictly improve by reducing marginally the upper support of their equilibrium contract offer: the marginally smaller offer discontinuously raises the probability of acceptance at an infinitesimally small share reduction. Thus, E[k
Because investigation costs c(q) > 0, it cannot be optimal for investor 1 to acquire information.
Finally, posit a partial pooling equilibrium in which investor 1 offers a contract following a bad signal σ(q) = b with positive probability. At the lower support of investor 1's offers following σ(q) = b, one must have E[k Proof of Lemma 1. I characterize equilibrium outcomes in all subgames. The results in the Lemma follow directly. Cases 1, 2 and 3a: E[X|σ(q) = g] > 1 + w and E[X|σ(q) = b] ≥ w. It follows that k(q) exists. Case 1: E[k(q)X] ≤ 1 and E[k(q)X|σ(q) = g] > 1. I first establish that the strategies described in the Lemma are an equilibrium. In equilibrium, investor 2's payoff is zero. If investor 2 offers k 2 < k(q), then E[(1−k 2 )X|σ(q) = b] > w so the offer is always accepted. Then, investor 2's profit would be E[k 2 X] − 1 < 0. If investor 2 offers k 2 > k(q) then his offer is never accepted and profits remain zero. Informed investor 1 would obviously lower his payoff if he offers k 1 < k(q). If he offers k 1 > k(q) then investor 2's offer of k 2 = k(q) will be accepted if any offers are accepted, and investor 1's payoff becomes zero.
I next characterize all equilibria of the subgame. First, note that any offer k < k(q) is acceptable to the entrepreneur independently of his beliefs. In particular, k < k(q) implies E[(1 − k)X|σ(q) = b] > w, so that such an offer is attractive to the entrepreneur even if he believes that σ(q) = b. Next, investor 1 never makes an offer k 1 < k(q) that is accepted with positive probability when σ(q) = b. Since E[k(q)X] ≤ 1 it follows that E[k 1 X|σ(q) = b] − 1 < 0 for k 1 < k(q), and hence investor 1 would lose money.
Let k U l be the minimum of the support of investor 2's equilibrium mixed strategy. Then k
> w and the offer is attractive to the entrepreneur even if he believes that σ(q) = b. This will be accepted when σ(q) = b with probability 1 because, as shown above, investor 1 does not make offers k 1 < k(q). Since k U l < k(q) and E[k(q)X] < 1 it follows that investor 2 loses money, a contradiction.
Next, note that investor 1's gross expected payoff is strictly positive when σ(q) = g. In particular, suppose investor 1 offers k 1 that is marginally smaller than k(q). Since k U l ≥ k(q) investor 1's offer beats the offer by investor 2, and since k 1 < k(q) the offer will be accepted. Since k 1 is only marginally smaller than k(q) and E[k(q)X|σ(q) = g] > 1 it follows that investor 1's equilibrium expected profits are strictly positive.
I now prove that k
, investor 1 offers k(q) with probability 1. Since k U l ≥ k(q) it follows immediately that k I l,g ≥ k(q); otherwise, investor 1 could strictly increase profits by increasing k I l,g , as the offer would be accepted with probability 1. Suppose by way of contradiction that k I h,g > k(q). I now show that investor 2's equilibrium payoff must also be strictly positive, as he could earn strictly positive expected profits by offering k 2 = k I h,g − ε.
If investor 1 makes no offer, then this reveals that σ(q) = b (investor 1 cannot randomize between making offers and not making offers when σ(q) = g because this would imply zero gross payoff). As a result, k 2 > k(q) implies that the entrepreneur does not accept investor 2's offer when there is no offer by investor 1. Now suppose that investor 1 offers k 1 > k 2 . Because k 2 is in the relative interior of the support of investor 1's mixed strategy for σ(q) = g, this occurs with strictly positive probability. Then the entrepreneur's posterior probability that σ(q) = g must be uniformly bounded away from 0 for all k 1 in the support of investor 1's mixed strategy, else offer k 1 would be rejected by the entrepreneur and investor 1's gross profits would be zero. Clearly,
Since ε can be chosen arbitrarily and the probability that σ(q) = g is uniformly bounded from below, it follows that investor 2's expected payoff from k 2 = k I h,g − ε is strictly positive. Indifference implies that both investors must earn positive payoff at k I h,g and k U h , respectively. Thus, k I h,g = k U h and these offers must be made with strictly positive probability. This, however, is a contradiction, as investor 2 could strictly increase his payoff by offering k 2 that is marginally less than k U h because the acceptance probability is increased discontinuously, a contradiction. Thus, k
with sufficiently high probability, else investor 1 would do better to raise his offer, which cannot be supported in equilibrium, as was just shown. Finally, investor 1's offer must be accepted when both investors offer the same k ≤ k(q), else investor 1 could reduce his offer marginally and fund the project for sure (as any offer k 1 < k(q) is accepted independently of beliefs). This completes the argument. Case 2: E[k(q)X] > 1 and E[k(q)X|σ(q) = g] > 1. One can assume that q > 0, else the result holds trivially. There are two subcases.
If offers k > k(q) are made by investor 1 (out of equilibrium) then I assume that the entrepreneur believes that σ(q) = b with probability 1. Let ξ be the probability that investor 2 makes an offer, and let F I and F U be the cdfs of informed investor 1's and uninformed investor 2's mixed strategies, respectively. Note that F U is the distribution of k 2 given that investor 2 makes an offer. Then the indifference conditions for the uninformed and informed investor are
Solving the indifference equations for F I and F U yields
Finally,
implies that F U (k(q)) = 1. Simple algebra reveals that 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 and that F I and F U are increasing functions of k. The indifference equations immediately reveal that
h,g is made with probability 1−F I (k) > 0. It is also obvious that no investor can improve by making offers outside [k, k(q)]. In particular, if the informed investor makes an offer k > k(q), it is rejected because the entrepreneur believes that σ(q) = b and hence his payoff would be negative.
It remains to prove that investor 1's equilibrium payoff is E[kX|σ(q) = g] − 1 > 0 when σ(q) = g, and 0 when σ(q) = b. Clearly, k 
Next, suppose by way of contradiction that k
This, however, implies that investor 2's expected payoff is strictly positive, as he can guarantee himself strictly positive profits by offering k 2 marginally less than k I l,g (since k 2 < k(q) the offer would be accepted in both states and k 2 > k ensures that E[k 2 X] − 1 > 0). Similarly, it follows that investor 1's profit is strictly positive. Thus, indifference across offers in the support of the mixed strategy implies that profits are strictly positive at k h,g and both are offered with strictly positive probability. However, this implies that investor 2 can strictly improve by offering k that is marginally less than k I h,g , because the lower offer discontinuously raises the acceptance probability, a contradiction.
If investor 1 makes offers when σ(q) = b then strictly positive profits at k U h and k
, if the entrepreneur learns with probability 1 that σ(q) = b then he will reject the contract. As a consequence, k
and k I h,g are again offered with strictly positive probability. Thus, one gets the same contradiction as in the previous paragraph.
The contradiction implies that k I l,g = k. This and indifference across the support of the mixing probability, implies that investor 1's expected payoff is E[kX|σ(q) = g] − 1 when σ(q) = g. Now suppose by way of contradiction that investor 1's gross payoff is strictly positive when σ(q) = b. Then investor 2's equilibrium profits are strictly positive, since investor 2 can get strictly positive profits by offering a k 2 that is marginally less than k I l,b , which is accepted with probability 1 when σ(q) = b. As above, one can conclude that k
and k I h,g are again offered with strictly positive probability, one gets the same contradiction, proving that the informed investor's profits are zero.
. Now investor 1 offersk if σ(q) = b and mixes over [k,k] when σ(q) = g. Whenk is offered by both investors, investor 1's offer is accepted. The cdf F I is again given by (7), because the indifference equation of investor 2 is as before. Investor 1's indifference equation is
Thus,
Note that 1 − F U (k) > 0 and thus investor 2 offers k 2 =k with strictly positive probability. The indifference condition for the uninformed investor implies that F I (k) = 1. Establishing that this is an equilibrium follows along the lines of Case 3b, i. Note that investor 1's offer must be accepted when both investors make the same offer k 1 = k 2 =k; if not, investor 1's payoff would drop atk, destroying indifference to k 1 in the support of his mixed strategy.
It remains to characterize investor 1's payoffs in all equilibria of the subgame. I first show that investor 1's expected payoff is E[kX|σ(q) = g] − 1 > 0 when σ(q) = g. The argument used in case 3b,i implies k Now suppose by way of contradiction that investor 1's payoff is strictly positive when σ(q) = b. Then profits must be strictly positive at k I h,b and this offer must be accepted with strictly positive probability. However, this implies that investor 2's profits must be positive as well, as he could offer k marginally smaller than k I h,b which would be accepted at least when σ(q) = b. Thus, both investors would make strictly positive profits, and mimicking the arguments above yields a contradiction. Thus, investor 1's profits are 0 when σ(q) = b.
Then both investors offering k and the entrepreneur accepting the contract if and only if investor 1 makes an offer, is an equilibrium. The payoff to both investors is zero. Because k ≥ k(q), the entrepreneur does not benefit from accepting k when σ(q) = b, i.e., when investor 1 does not make an offer.
Suppose by way of contradiction that investor 1 makes strictly positive profits. Then E[X|σ(q) = g] > 1 and k I l,g > k(q). Then investor 2 must also make strictly positive profits, else he could offer k with k(q) < k < k I l,g . Mimicking the arguments above, yields a contradiction. Case 3b: E[X|σ(q) = g] − 1 ≤ w. There does not exist a k that gives an investor and the entrepreneur non-negative expected payoffs. Hence, no mutually acceptable offer exists, so that all equilibria in this subgame involve no investment and payoffs are zero. Case 3c: E[X|σ(q) = g] > 1 + w and E[X|σ(q) = b] < w. To construct an equilibrium, choose the k that solves E[kX|σ(q) = g] = 1. Investor 1 offers k 1 = k if and only if σ(q) = g, and investor 2 always offers k 2 = k. The entrepreneur accepts an offer if and only if investor 1 makes an offer. To see that this is an equilibrium, observe first that investors earn zero expected profits. A unilateral increase in k 1 or k 2 yields zero profits as it is always rejected, and a decrease is accepted whenever investor 1 makes an offer and results in negative expected profits. Finally, the signal is revealed through investor 1's action and because E[X|σ(q) = b] < w, the entrepreneur rejects investor 2's offer whenever investor 1 does not make an offer. Now suppose by way of contradiction that an equilibrium exists in which investor 1 makes strictly positive gross profits. Let k I h,g be the highest offer in the support of investor 1's possibly mixed strategy on the equilibrium path when σ(q) = g. This offer must be accepted with strictly positive probability, else profits would be zero. If investor 1 makes an offer when σ(q) = b, let k h,g reveals that σ(q) = g. Thus, if investor 2 offers k I h,g − ε, he makes strictly positive profits for ε > 0, sufficiently small: (i) the offer is accepted with strictly positive probability since it is in the relative interior of the support of investor 1's mixed strategy; and (ii) the offer is only accepted by the entrepreneur if there is a higher offer by investor 1, as such an offer reveals σ(q) = g. Thus, investor 2's expected equilibrium profits must be strictly positive. Let k U h be the highest offer in the support of investor 2's possibly mixed strategy. Thus, k U h must also be accepted with strictly positive probability, else investor 2's expected profits would be zero. This is only possible if k Proof of Theorem 2. For investor 1 to be willing to acquire information, his gross payoff of the stage 2 subgame must cover c(q). Lemma 1 reveals that this is only true in cases 1 and 2. Thus, investor 1's payoff given q is pE min{k(q), k}X σ(q) = g − c(q).
(9)
+ w, or else investor 1's payoff including costs c(q) would be strictly negative, and he could improve by not investigating. As a consequence, if an equilibrium with information acquisition exists, then k(q) exists for any q that is chosen in equilibrium. Thus, investor 1's payoff can be obtained by maximizing (9). Conversely, suppose k and q solve Problem 2. Then Lemma 1 implies that the strategies are an equilibrium and that equilibria exist in all subgames.
Proof of Theorem 3. Fix the expected project payoff, E[X] = px. Then decreasing p while keeping E[X] fixed increases the variance.
Substituting for q and k into the objective of Problem 2 and using E[X] = px yields investor 1's equilibrium gross payoffs,
The second derivative of (10) with respect to p is
2(1−p) 3/2 > 0, i.e., the payoff is convex in p.
If both constraints of Problem 2 bind, then solving the two constraints reveals that investor 1's payoff is
which is a linear function of p.
Optimization by investor 1 implies that this line is tangent to (10), so that if constraint 2 binds then it binds for all p between the tangency point p t X and p = 1. Note that if p = 1 and constraint 2 is slack thenx < 1 + w, so that (11) is −c, i.e., informed finance is again not feasible. It follows that in a neighborhood of p = 1, i.e., when variance is low, that informed finance is not feasible. Figure 2 depicts the three cases that can arise. The first two panels of Figure 2 consider the case where constraint 2 binds for sufficiently large p, and the right panel considers the case where constraint 2 never binds. In all three cases it follows immediately that if only the first constraint binds and the net payoff is non-negative then the convex payoff curve must decrease in p, i.e., the payoff strictly increases in the variance, whenever informed investment occurs. Finally, if both constraints bind then a non-negative payoff can only occur if the linear payoff curve is decreasing (as the payoff at p = 1 is −c). Again, this implies that the payoff on this range increases in the variance.
Proof of Lemma 2. The result is standard if X has only a finite number of realizations, so suppose that f j (x) is the density of X given σ(q) = j, j = b, g. Problem 4 is equivalent to
Let α be the maximized value of (12). Let κ n , n ∈ N be a sequence with lim n→∞ xκ n (x)f b (x) dx = α, where κ n fulfills the constraint of (12) for all n ∈ N. Kómlos' Theorem, Komlos [1967] , implies that there exist a subsequence κ n i , i ∈ N and a function κ * such that
Convexity and closedness of S implies that κ * ∈ S.
It follows immediately that κ * fulfills the constraint of the optimization problem. In particular,
where the equality follows from Lebesgue's dominated convergence Theorem, and the inequality from the fact that each κ n i fulfills the constraint. Thus,
as lim i→∞ xκ n i (x)f b (x) dx = α implies that that averages, given by the righthand side of (14), converge to α as well. Thus, (13) and Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem imply that κ * solves (12). Let κ γ be the solution of (12) for a given γ. It is immediate that xκ γ (x)f (x) dx is strictly increasing in γ. It remains to prove continuity. Suppose by way of contradiction that xκ γ (x)f b (x) dx has a discontinuity at γ. Then there exists ε > 0 such that for all δ > 0 there exists γ < γ < γ + δ such that
Let κ(x) = γ γ κ γ (x). Then convexity of S and the fact that 0 ∈ S implies that κ ∈ S. Note that xκ(x)f g (x)dx ≤ γ, i.e., κ fulfills the constraint of Problem (12) for γ. However, I first analyze the subgames starting at stage 2, i.e., after the choice of q. Claim 1: Let K g be the support of contracts offered by investor 1 in state g. Then 1. κ ∈ K g for any contract that is offered by investor 1 and accepted with positive probability in state b. 2. If σ(q) = b, then the probability that investor 1 offers a contract κ ∈ K g is strictly less than one.
3. max κ∈Kg E[κ(X)X|σ(q) = b] ≤ 1: investor 1 cannot earn strictly positive gross profits by offering a contract κ ∈ K g in state b.
Suppose by way of contradiction that contract κ / ∈ K g is offered in equilibrium. Then in equilibrium the entrepreneur must assign probability 1 to σ(q) = b. Thus, E[X|σ(q) = b] ≤ E[X] < 1 + w implies that either the entrepreneur or investor 1 loses money, a contradiction of optimizing behavior.
Next, suppose that investor 1 always offers a contract κ ∈ K g when σ(q) = b. Let K b be the support of the contracts offered when σ(q) = b. Then the first part of claim 1 implies that K b ⊂ K g . Thus, there exists a contract κ such that the entrepreneur believes that σ(q) = g has occurred with probability ρ(κ) < P ({σ(q) = g}).
, where the first inequality holds because investor 1's gross payoff E[κ(X)X|σ(q) = b] − 1 ≥ 0 (else he would not offer investment) and E[X] < 1 + w. Thus,
Since E[κ(X))X|σ(q) = s] ≥ 1 for s = g, b, the fact that E[X] < 1+w implies E[(1 − κ(X))X] < w. This and (16) imply that the entrepreneur's expected payoff from accepting contract κ is strictly less than w, a contradiction. The third statement of the claim now follows immediately from the second statement.
The remaining argument follows that of Lemma 1 with modifications. Note, that Lemma 1 immediately extends if there are many states but contracts are restricted to equity shares. Thus, if I show that the multidimensional contract design problem is equivalent to the one-dimensional problem of choosing an equity share then Lemma 1 can be applied. Cases 1,2, 3a. If E[X|σ(q) = b] ≥ w then Lemma 2 implies that a contract κ(x) exists such that (i) E[(1 −κ(X))X|σ(q) = b] = w, and (ii) there does not exist a contract κ (·) with ψ g (κ ) ≤ ψ g (κ) and E[(1 − κ (X))X|σ(q) = b] < w. Case 1. Suppose that E[κ(X)X] ≤ 1 and E[k(q)X|σ(q) = g] > 1 where k(q) = ψ g (κ). The argument of Lemma 1 implies that the following is an equilibrium: investor 1 offers k(q) if and only if σ(q) = g, and investor 2 offersκ(·), which is not accepted in equilibrium. It remains to prove that it is not optimal for investor 1 to offer a contract when σ(q) = b. Let κ be a contract offered when σ(q) = b. If E[(1 − κ(X))X|σ(q) = b] < w then κ will not be accepted, if the entrepreneur holds the belief that σ(q) = b. Thus, the deviation does not increase investor 1's payoff. If, instead, E[(1 − κ(X))X|σ(q) = b] ≥ w then the contract is acceptable to the entrepreneur even if σ(q) = b. However, E[X] < 1 + w implies E[κ(X)X|σ(q) = b] − 1 < 0, i.e., investor 1 loses money and the deviation makes him worse off.
I now characterize all equilibria of this subgame. Again one can conclude that any contract κ with ψ g (κ) < k(q) is accepted by the entrepreneur independently of beliefs, since E[(1 − κ(X))X|σ(q) = s] > w for s = g, b by the definition of k(q), and because ψ g (κ) < k(q). Thus, E[k(q)X] ≤ 1 implies that investor 1 never offers such a contract when σ(q) = b.
Let k U l = min ψ g (K U ), where K U is the support of investor 2's possibly mixed strategy. As in Lemma 1 one can prove that k U ≥ k(q). In particular, if k U l < k(q) then the definition of k(q) and the fact that E[k(q)X] ≤ 1 imply that the contract is accepted by the entrepreneur at least when σ(q) = b (because investor 1 never makes an offer when σ(q) = b), resulting in a negative payoff to investor 2.
Let k To construct an equilibrium, define for each k the contract κ k that solves max E[(1 − κ(X))X|σ(q) = b] subject to ψ g (κ) = k. Choose k such that E[κ k (X)X] = 1. Let K = {κ k |k ∈ [k, k(q)}. I can therefore describe the mixed strategies of the uninformed and the informed party, respectively, as cdfs F It follows immediately that F I (k) is increasing and that F I (k) = 0. Moreover, since E[κ(X)X] > 1 andκ = κ k(q) it follows that F I (k(q)) < 1, i.e., k(q) is offered with strictly positive probability.
The proof that all equilibria are payoff equivalent to the equilibrium just constructed is almost identical to Lemma 1. For informed investor 1, one can identify the set of contracts K I g offered in state σ(q) = g by the set of equivalent shares ψ g (K I g ). As shown at the beginning, offers by investor 1 when σ(q) = b yield zero gross payoff and therefore do not contribute to his payoffs. Finally, uninformed investor 2 must always choose a contract that solves max ψ b (κ) subject to ψ g (κ) = k, where k is a fixed share. Otherwise, if κ does not solve this optimization problem, the uninformed investor could strictly increase his payoff by offering κ with ψ g (κ ) = ψ b (κ) but ψ b (κ ) > ψ b (κ), because informed investor 1 does not compete in state b. Case 3a. Analogous. Case 3b. No change. Case 3c. The existence part is the same. In particular, since investor 1 does not offer a contract when σ(q) = b, the state is revealed to all parties, and given contract offers κ i , i = 1, 2 by the two investors, the entrepreneur will choose the contract that corresponds to the lower share in the good state, i.e., for which ψ g (κ i ) is less. All profits are competed away. Conversely, first suppose that investor 1 does not offer a contract when σ(q) = b. Then since only the equivalent shares ψ g (κ i ) matter, the problem is one-dimensional and hence equivalent to that in Lemma 1. Now suppose that investor 1 offers a contract in state σ(q) = b with strictly positive probability. Again, assume by way of contradiction that investor 1's gross payoff is strictly positive. Let K b be the support of offers when σ(q) = b. If κ / ∈ K g then the state is revealed and the argument above extends. Accordingly, suppose that κ ∈ K g . Then κ must be accepted with strictly positive probability, else investor 1's gross payoff when σ(q) = g would be zero when κ is offered. This, in turn, would imply that investor 1's payoff is always zero when σ(q) = g, which would complete the proof. Let k I h,g = sup ψ g (K g ). If ψ g (κ) < k I h,g then investor 2 could get a strictly positive payoff from offering κ. Thus, investor 2's equilibrium payoff would have to be positive, and one gets a contradiction as in Lemma 1. Thus, suppose that ψ g (κ) = k I h,g . Then investor 2 could make strictly positive profits by offering a contract λκ, where λ < 1 but sufficiently close to 1, and a contradiction again obtains.
The remainder of the proof follows along the lines of Theorem 2. However, note that if Problem 3 does not have a solution then this implies that the game does not have an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 5. In text.
Proof of Theorem 6. I first analyze the subgames starting at the point where the entrepreneur has accepted the ex-ante contract. It is sufficient to characterize equilibria of the subgame where the gross payoff to investor 1 binds at an optimum.
Suppose by way of contradiction that E[(1−κ U (X))X|σ(q) = b] > w at a solutionκ U ,q,k. Letk be marginally greater thek. Lemma 2 implies that κ U that solves Problem 4 for k =k satisfies E[(1 −κ U (X))X|σ(q) = b] > w. Thus,κ U ,q,k satisfy all constraints of the modified optimization problem, however, the objective is increased, a contradiction.
